

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 2214

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PEPR, TU
SUBJ: US-GOT RELATIONS

IF DECISION ON DCA GOES IN THE UNFORTUNATE DIRECTION
IN WHICH SOME BELIEVE IT IS TENDING, FOLLOWING IS
TEXT OF MESSAGE I WOULD SEND. SINCE THINGS COULD
DEVELOP RAPIDLY AND IN VIEW OF MY ABSENCE FROM ANKARA
BEGINNING MARCH 25, I THOUGHT I SHOULD SEND YOU MY
THOUGHTS EVEN IN ADVANCE OF ANY FINAL DECISION.

A. ECEVIT'S REACTION IS THE KEY QUESTION IN RELATION
TO THE US DECISION TO SEEK LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO
BUT NOT ENDORSEMENT OF THE DCA. SINCE HIS OUTBURST
FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S ANSWER TO SENATOR SCHWEIKER
MARCH 9, ECEVIT HAS REPEATED AND COMMENTED HIS BELIEF
THAT THE US BROKE ITS WORD ABOUT LINKING THE EMBARGO
TO THE DCA. ALMOST CERTAINLY, THE US DECISION NOT
TO PRESS FOR THE DCA IN CONGRESS WILL STRIKE HIM AS
FRESH AND PERHAPS INTOLERABLE EVIDENCE OF US
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UNTRUSTWORTHINESS AND US HOSTILITY TOWARD HIM
PERSONALLY.

B. IRONY, OF COURSE, IS THAT LIFTING OF EMBARGO AND
DEFERRAL OF DCA WAS ECEVIT'S INITIAL PREFERENCE.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE PAINTED OURSELVES INTO A
CORNER BY THE WAY WE HAVE HANDLED MATTER EVER SINCE

VANCE VISIT, BY ALMOST TOTALLY FOCUSING IN OUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH TURKS AT ALL LEVELS ON IMPORTANCE OF DCA, WHICH WE HAVE GENERALLY HELD TO BE NO MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE THAN LIFTING OF EMBARGO WOULD BE. IN CONSEQUENCE THE DCA RATHER THAN THE EMBARGO HAS BECOME THE SYMBOL OF THE PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ACCORDINGLY, US DECISION, AT PRESENT JUNCTURE, WILL BE SEEN NEGATIVELY AS A DECISION NOT TO PASS THE DCA MORE THAN IT WILL BE SEEN POSITIVELY AS A DECISION TO LIFT THE EMBARGO. IT WILL BE REGARDED AS CAPTUALTAION TO THE GREEKS AND TO THE GREEK LOBBY AND HAVE THE SECONDARY EFFECT OF MAKING IMPROVEMENT IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONSHIP THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

C. ECEVIT MAY REACT ANGRILY AND HASTILY. HE COULD DIRECT HIS RETALIATION AGAINST ANY OR ALL OF SEVERAL PTOENTIAL TARGETS: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT EFFORTS, TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS, US INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY, COOPERATION WITH THE US IN VARIOUS FIELDS, EVEN TURKEY'S NATO ROLE. HE COULD AT A MINIMUM CREATE A FRESH WAVE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM, OR OPEN THE CLOSED DOOR OF POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS.

D. BUT IF HE IS ABLE TO CONTAIN HIS INITIAL REACTION AND CONSIDER THE SITUATION RATIONALLY, HIS NEXT STEPS ARE LIKELY TO BE CONDITIONED BY:

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(1) THE MANNER IN WHICH WE PRESENT OUR DECISION-- ARBITRARILY OR WITH AN EFFORT TO CONSULT WITH HIM AND SHOW HIME DUE CONSIDERATION.

(2) A JUDGMENT ON WHICH WOULD BETTER ADVANCE HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSITION--PRESENTING OUR DECISION AS HIS DECISION, DENOUNCING IT AND RETALIATING, OR SOME INTERMEDIATE COURSE.

(3) WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE WE OFFER IS, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, POLITICALLY DEFENSIBLE AS ADEQUATE FOR TURKEY'S DEFENSE NEEDS.

E. I URGE THAT WE TRY TO CONTROL ECEVIT'S REACTION BY HAVING A HIGH-LEVEL EMISSARY COME TO ANKARA (PREFERABLY AT TURKISH INVATION, WHICH I COULD ARRANGE) TO DISCUSS ENTIRE PROBLEM DIRECTLY WITH ECEVIT. THIS WILL HELP ALLOW TIME FOR SECOND THOUGHTS TO REIN IN WHAT WILL MOST CERTAINLY BE HIS INITIAL, EXTREMELY NEGATIVE REACTION, AND TO LET HIS POLITICIAN'S SENSE WORK ON THE PROBLEM TO SEE HOW US DECISION CAN BE

PROTRAYED IN BEST LIGHT, OR EVEN AS RESPONSIVE TO HIS OWN NEEDS AND DESIRES.

F. THE ONLY EMISSARIES I THINK WOULD DO ARE VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE BRZEZINSKI OR BROWN. IT HAS TO BE SOMEONE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT AND POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE. IT CANNOT BE EITHER NIMETZ OR MYSELF, SINCE OUR POSITIONS WILL HAVE BEEN MADE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY UNTENABLE BY THIS DECISION. (TURKS IN THEIR HEART OF HEARTS FULLY EXPECT US TO COME OUT IN FAVOR OF DCA PASSAGE AT UPCOMING HEARINGS. THEY ARE QUITE CONSCIOUS THAT NIMETZ WAS THE FIRST WASHINGTON EMISSARY WHO CAME TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO QUESTION OF IMPASSE ON DCA, AND I WAS THE ONE WHO, IN NOVEMBER, TRANSMITTED THE PRESIDENT'S SECRET

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WILLINGNESS TO SEEK DCA PASSAGE).

G. FOR BEST EFFECT, EMISSARY SHOULD BUILD ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) OUR VOTE COUNT HAS LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT WE CANNOT ACHIEVE PASSAGE OF TURKISH DCA WITHOUT IS BEING TWINNED WITH GREEK DCA. AN ADMINISTRATION DECISION TO ATTEMPT THIS WOULD NOT ONLY RUN THE HIGH RISK OF FAILURE BUT WOULD JEOPARDIZE IMPORTANT PRESIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON WHOSE COOPERATION HE MUST COUNT IF HE IS TO ACHIEVE BROAD NATIONAL OBJECTIVES.

(2) ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT, WE BELIEVE THAT ADMINISTRATION CAN ACHIEVE A LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO SINCE WE WILL NOT FACE THE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WE WOULD HAVE WITH DCA FROM THOSE WHO OPPOSE A MULTI-YEAR COMMITMENT OF THE KIND IT EMBODIES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS OUTCOME IS NOT THE BEST ONE EITHER FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TURKEY OR THE UNITED STATES. FOR US, IT MEANS ALMOST CERTAINLY THE TURKIS WILL CONSIDER THAT WITHOUT A DCA THERE IS NO BASIS FOR REOPENING THE SHUTDOWN FACILITIES. FOR THE TURKS, IT MEANS NO GRANT ASSISTANCE IN FY '79 AND UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT FUTURE ASSISTANCE LEVELS.)

(3) SINCE IT HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN ECEVIT'S IDEA THAT WE SHOULD FIRST REMOVE THE "NEGATIVE" FACTOR IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, I.E. THE EMBARGO AND THEN MOVE ON TO WORK OUT THE "POSITIVE" FACTOR, I.E. THE DCA, WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT THIS DECISION IS PATTERNED AS ONE WHICH RESPONDS TO HIS OWN INITIAL PREFERENCES. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO ASK FOR A MODEST SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SECRET

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IN 1979. ALTHOUGH WE REALIZE THAT THIS IS NOT AS DESIRABLE AS THE GRANT ASSISTANCE ON WHICH THE TURKISH MILITARY HAD BEEN COUNTING, IT REPRESENTS A BEGINNING THAT IS SUBJECT TO FUTURE EXPANSION.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 2214

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(R) WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO TURKISH DESIRES TO RENEGOTIATE THE DCA AND RECOGNIZE THAT ITS PROVISIONS AND DURATION WOULD HAVE TO PARALLEL THOSE OF THE GREEK DCA, WHEN AND IF THAT IS SIGNED. MEANWHILE, WE WOULD NOT DO FOR THE GREEKS WHAT WE WOULD NOT DO FOR THE TURKS, I.E., PRESS FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF ONE DCA BEFORE THE OTHER IS SIGNED.

H. IN THE INTERIM ECEVIT'S POSITION INTERNALLY COULD BE EASED BY A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT: A) THAT THE US WAS TURNING KARAMURSEL OVER TO TURKEY AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO BE GENEROUS IN LEAVING THE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT THERE PRACTICALLY INTACT FOR TURKISH MILITARY USE; B) THAT TURKEY WILL ASSUME OPERATION OF KARGABURUN AND BELBASI, WITH US TURNING OVER TO TURKEY THE EQUIPMENT AT THESE TWO FACILITIES AND PROVIDING TRAINING AND FINANCING

FOR TURKISH OPERATION THEROF; C) THAT SINOP AND
DIYARBAKIR WILL REMAIN IN STANBY STATUS UNTIL A
NEW DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED THAT
WILL PERMIT THEIR REOPENING; D) THAT THE USG WOULD
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UNDERTAKE TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE DCA
SWEETNER PACKAGE CONTAINED IN THE KISSINGER/
CAGLAYANGIL NOTE OF MARCH 26, 1976 AND THE
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LETTER TO CAGLAYANGIL OF
MARCH 26, 1976.

IN RETURN WE WOULD ASK TURKEY AT THE TIME OF LIFTING
OF THE EMBARGO TO REVOKE "PROVISIONAL STATUS" IN
ITS APPLICATION TO US FORCES AT NATO SUPPORT
FACILITIES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS REVOCATION
OF PROVISIONAL STATUS WILL IN ITSELF HAVE TO BE PROVISIONAL
PENDING CONCLUSION OF A NEW DCA WITHIN A REASONABLE
PERIOD OF TIME.

I. AT SAME TIME WE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT A JOINT
US-TURKISH MILITARY PLANNING TEAM HAD BEEN
ESTABLISHED TO WORK OUT A SIX-YEAR MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM FOR TURKISH FORCES. THE WORK OF THIS TEAM
WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE NEW FMS, SSA AND GRANT ASSISTANCE SUPPORTING
LEVELS TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE REVISED DCA.

J. THE OUTCOME OF THIS APPROACH WILL DEPEND
ENTIRELY ON HOW ECEVIT WANTS TO PLAY IT. IF WE
HIT HIM COLD (HE IS ALREADY REPORTEDLY FURIOUS THAT
HE HAS RECEIVED NO COMMUNICATION FROM THE SECRETARY
"EXPLAINING" HIS MARCH 9 STATEMENT) IT WILL
PROBABLY DEAL A SEVERE SETBACK TO OUR OWN RELATION-
SHIPS WITH TURKEY AND TURKEY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD
NATO. THE FACT THAT THERE WILL BE NO GRANT
ASSISTANCE UNDER OUR POSITION WILL UPSET AND
INFURIATE THE MILITARY SINCE, WITHOUT SUCH
ASSISTANCE, THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF TURKEY
BEGINNING TO MEET ITS NATO REQUIREMENTS. OUR
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UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH THE DCA IN THE FACE
OF THE HIGHLY-PUBLICIZED EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT
FOR IT IN THE CONGRESS WILL BE INTERPRETED IN THE
WORST POSSIBLE LIGHT.

K. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE CATER TO ECEVIT A LITTLE AND GIVE HIM SOME "TURN AROUND TIME", HE POSSIBLY CAN BE BROUGHT TO A MORE TEMPERATE REACTION IF WE HELP HIM SEE SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES OF RELAXING AND ACCEPTING THE POLITICALLY IN-EVITABLE. THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES TO HIM ARE THAT, PROPERLY HANDLED, HE CAN CHARACTERIZE THIS AS RESPONSIVE TO HIS OWN FIRST IMPULSES, AS RESULTING IN A REDUCED US BASE STRUCTURE IN TURKEY, AS ACHIEVEMENT OF THE BEGINNINGS OF A SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE DCA WILL BE RENEGOTIATED IN THE LIGHT OF A JOINT PLANNING EFFORT. I THINK, HOWEVER, THIS CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A DIRECT VISIT FROM SOMEONE WHO IS SEEN TO BE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND WHO CAN AUTHORITATIVELY REFLECT HIS THINKING.

L. HAVING OUTLINED THE POSSIBILITY OF TEMPERING ECEVIT'S REACTION, I THINK IT IS NECESSARY TO POINT OUT AGAIN THAT, WHATEVER WE DO, IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT THE TURKISH REACTION TO A DECISION TO ABANDON THE DCA WILL BE IMMEDIATE AND EXPLOSIVE. IF IT IS, THE CHANCES OF OUR BEING ABLE TO CONTAIN SUCH A REACTION WITHOUT DEEP AND PERMANENT DAMAGE TO THE US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP ARE NOT VERY GOOD. SPIERS

NOTE BY OC/T: SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 2014 NOT RECEIVED IN THE DEPARTMENT AT THIS TIME, 3/23/78 2 PM.

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